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he enactment of the Lisbon Treaty raised the level of expectation regarding the EU’s 
role on the global stage to a new high. One of the major institutional innovations, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and its head, the new High Representative 
and Commission Vice-President (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton, were expected to put right a 
whole series of problems that have beset EU foreign policy for years. The range of issues 
demanding attention include:  improving the decision-making process, pooling diplomatic 
expertise, reacting in a timely and appropriate manner to world events, bringing greater 
consistency and coherence to the EU’s external action – and all this at minimal cost.  
In the first year and a half of its existence, however, the EEAS and its head have become the 
target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in 
fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been 
blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the 
institutional divide’. These criticisms have often remained rather general, however, lacking 
empirical foundation and not taking into consideration the distribution of competences 
between the EU institutions and the EU member states, or indeed the complex decision-
making processes that govern the interaction between them.  
Moreover, recriminations have often been ‘personalised’ and directed to the HR/VP, who is 
taken to be the embodiment of the EEAS itself. But any responsible critique of EEAS’ 
performance should make a distinction between, inter alia, what the desirable foreign policy 
goals of the EU are and the policy space available to the EEAS to actually achieve these goals.  
An examination of the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework reveals that the criticism 
directed at the EEAS is somewhat unfair. The discretionary power of the EEAS in this policy 
area is limited to that of an agenda-setter and for the rest is greatly dependent on the largest 
common policy denominator between a wide range of stakeholders. EEAS’ performance in 
the Eastern Partnership should therefore be evaluated against the backdrop of constraints 
imposed by the operational environment in which the EU’s diplomatic service finds itself.  
The Eastern Partnership’s objectives are implemented through twin bilateral and multilateral 
tracks. Unlike the bilateral dimension, the multilateral track functions largely outside of the 
legal framework. It is the result of political process and complements bilateral relations. 
Institutionally, the Eastern Partnership’s multilateral dimension encompasses the biannual 
Summit of the Heads of State or Government, annual ministerial meetings, senior officials’ 
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gatherings on four thematic platforms, supported by expert panels. These structures 
incorporate all the relevant actors of the Partnership. 
The EEAS as agenda-setter 
The EEAS plays a role at each level of the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework. The 
HR/VP takes part in the summits and ministerial meetings, and in coordination with the 
directors-general of the Commission, the EEAS is the ‘first mover’ in the preparation of the 
Eastern Partnership Roadmaps, which function as a broader work programme within the 
cooperation. Moreover, the EEAS’ Director of Russia, the Eastern Partnership, Central Asia 
and the OSCE, chairs the Platform (N1) dealing with ‘Democracy, good governance and 
stability.’ This grants the EEAS the power to set the agenda on the political platform of the 
Eastern Partnership, (the director is assisted by the EEAS’ III.B.1 unit, which also deals with 
the Regional Cooperation and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE)). Furthermore, the EEAS supports the work of the three other thematic platforms 
that are chaired by the Commission. The EEAS does therefore have some limited powers.  
Controlled by Partnership governments 
The EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is 
nevertheless restricted by the decision-making procedure, by the member states and the 
partner countries’ competences, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations 
and the Civil Society Forum (see below for more on this forum). Decision-making in the 
multilateral framework of the Eastern Partnership requires consensus among 33 states (27 
member states and 6 Eastern partners). The EEAS’ role is therefore limited to conducting the 
‘orchestra’ of 33 ‘musicians’ in such a way that all the partners agree to play from the same 
score.  
As an illustration of consensus-building prior to decision: to prepare the Eastern Partnership 
Roadmaps 2012-2013, the EEAS held four consultations with the Council’s Working Party on 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) where all the member states are represented. 
Besides the COEST, the EEAS held separate meetings with some member states bilaterally 
and in smaller groups (e.g. the Visegrád Group). During nearly three months of consultation, 
the EEAS sought the ex ante ‘indication’ of member states’ support, which also maintain the 
right to endorse the Roadmaps in the Council conclusions ex post.  
Finding a consensus among the member states on the Roadmaps is complemented by the 
search for agreement among the Eastern partners themselves. The EEAS held three rounds of 
consultations with the six partner countries together and two rounds of consultations with 
the each of them bilaterally.  
Collectively, the member states and the Eastern partners also participate and take decisions 
in the summits, ministerial meetings and thematic platforms. Divergent interests, conflicting 
preferences and different priorities among the member states and partner governments 
characterise relations among the Eastern Partnership member governments. For the EU’s 
diplomatic service to find common ground among the states involved in the Eastern 
Partnership is therefore a multifaceted process. 
Bound by institutional checks 
To varying degrees, the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), the 
Committee of Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
are also involved either as ‘full’ or ‘permanent’ participants of the Eastern Partnership 
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thematic platforms. The formal decision-making right is reserved only to the ‘full 
participants.’  
The European Commission is present at the summits and ministerial meetings, chairs two-to-
four thematic platforms and is a ‘full participant’ of the Platform N1. The EP is invited to 
take part in the summits and is a ‘permanent participant’ of platforms. The EP also holds 
discussions in its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), issues resolutions in plenary sittings 
and in the newly created EURONEST parliamentary assembly. The Committee of Regions 
focuses on the role of the local governments, primarily through the Conference of the 
Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP). The EESC issues 
advisory opinions arguing for, inter alia, the greater involvement of civil society actors and 
social partners. The EIB and EBRD are ‘permanent participants’ of the Platform N2 
(Economic integration and convergence with EU policies) and N3 (Energy security) and are 
involved in a number of flagship initiatives. Through their respective roles, the 
aforementioned bodies thus function as ‘institutional checks’ on the EEAS; further limiting 
its discretionary power. 
A number of relevant international and regional organisations are also invited to some of the 
platforms as ‘permanent participants’, not enjoying decision-making powers. The 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is invited to take part in 
Platform N1, for example. The Council of Europe is a participant in Platforms N1 and N4 
(Contacts between people). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) takes part in Platform N4. 
Monitored by civil society 
The Civil Society Forum has assumed the role of ‘third party’ monitor of the Eastern 
Partnership multilateral framework. The Forum brings together the EU’s and partner 
countries’ civil society actors to facilitate their input into the Eastern Partnership. The Forum 
participates in all platforms and in the ministerial meetings, and is also consulted by the 
EEAS in matters related to the Roadmaps and the agenda of the Partnership. The Civil 
Society Forum, with its national platforms and thematic groups, is well placed to sound the 
‘fire alarm’ should the EEAS not fulfil or even overstep its mandate. 
Conclusion 
In the case of the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework, the EEAS is closely monitored 
and tightly ‘controlled’ by the member states and a multiplicity of actors at national, 
European and intergovernmental level. This applies to the many other domains in which the 
EEAS is active. The mode of decision-making thus places a substantial number of brakes on 
the discretionary power of the EEAS. Any responsible analysis or critique of the service 
should therefore take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able 
to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so. 
